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Between the Species
Animal Morality: Control Without
Reflective Self-Awareness

ABSTRACT
Non-human animals can act morally by acting on the basis of moral
emotions such as concern without being morally responsible in the
sense of deserving praise or blame. They can unconsciously select
from different motivations and so have the requisite control over their
behavior for moral normativity yet lack awareness of their reasons as
reasons and so lack the self-reflection and understanding required for
full moral responsibility. This is an alternative to Mark Rowlands’
compatibilist construal of non-human animals as moral subjects.
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Can non-human animals be moral? Animals can behave in
ways that seem moral. There is growing evidence that they
act out of moral emotions such as compassion, empathy, grief,
kindness, and tolerance (Bekoff and Pierce 2010). For one example, a dog pulled another who was injured from a busy highway, apparently displaying concern and courage.1 For another
example, one elephant chased an aggressive elephant away
from another elephant with an injured leg and then touched the
injured leg in an apparently empathetic or consoling gesture
(Rowlands 2015, 4). However, it also seems that because they
lack awareness and understanding of why they act as they do,
animals cannot be morally responsible for their actions. Moreover, moral actions are actions that should or should not be
done, and this normativity cannot apply to animals who lack
control over their motivations for acting as they do, it seems.
Accordingly, the common, as well as traditional, view is that
only one who can evaluate their motives for acting has the requisite control over them necessary to make moral choices, and
only humans have this self-reflective capacity. On this view,
apparently moral animal behavior is not genuinely moral behavior. In this essay, I appeal to an agent causation theory of
freedom to describe how animals can be moral, contra the traditional view, yet not be morally autonomous enough to warrant praise or blame. This follows a distinction between moral
agents and moral subjects made by Mark Rowlands, and I construct my view as an alternative to Rowlands’ compatibilist
view that animals can act for moral reasons despite lacking
control over their actions (Rowlands 2015).

“Hero Dog Saves Another Dog after Getting Hit in the Highway.”
YouTube, 7 Apr. 2009, www.youtube.com/watch?v=kTg5VGbzTq8.
1
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Rowlands’ Compatibilist View of Animal
Morality
Rowlands says non-human animals should not be considered
moral agents because agency connotes responsibility. He notes
the absurdity of punishing animals for their actions to satisfy
justice (Rowlands 2015, 83). Animals are not sufficiently responsible for their actions to deserve punishment because they
lack understanding of their own motives and of moral right and
wrong. However, animals can be motivated to act by moral
emotions such as concern, and so should be considered moral
“subjects” according to Rowlands.
Against the objection that animals cannot act for moral reasons because they lack the ability to critically evaluate their
motives required for the control over them necessary for moral
normativity, Rowlands forcefully argues there is no viable account of how critical scrutiny of one’s motivations can provide
control over them: one’s evaluations of motives do not provide
control unless one has control over them. The notion of control
is not rendered intelligible by adding a higher level of awareness, no matter how many levels are added. Just as someone
ignorant of their motives may be thought caused to act by the
reasons and emotions they have no control over due to this lack
of awareness, one fully aware of their motives may be caused
to critically evaluate their motives in ways they have no control
over. The ideas of awareness and of the capacity for critical
assessment of one’s own motives, commonly thought to provide the self-control required for moral behavior, do not at all
include, even implicity, an idea of control, and we have no other
suitable notion of control, according to Rowlands (Rowlands
2015, chapters 6-7).
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Rowlands argues that we should therefore instead construe
normativity in terms of external reasons that one’s actions may
accord with more or less well, and construe moral responsibility in terms of understanding. For example, if there is objective
moral reason for an elephant to feel distressed at the pain of
another elephant and to console her, one can say the elephant’s
emotions were what she should feel and her actions were what,
morally, should have been done. The necessity of her emotions
and actions does not remove this kind of normativity. Therefore, as long as her behavior is due to a reliable morally appropriate emotional responsiveness (rather than being accidentally
morally appropriate), this counts as moral action. This is so
even if the elephant lacks control over her actions, and even if
the elephant cannot recognize, as humans can, that the action
is what should be done. This externalist account of moral normativity also applies to humans, but it is still true that animals
cannot be praised or blamed for their behavior as humans can.
The crucial difference between animal moral subject freedom
and the moral agent freedom warranting praise or blame that
most humans have lies not in the idea of control, but solely in
that the latter involves moral and self understanding and the
former does not.
So Rowlands’ compatibilist construal of animals as moral
subjects is based on his claims that the ability to critically evaluate one’s motives does not give one control over one’s motives
and that there is no other suitable notion of control. Rowlands’
argument for the former, that the ability to critically evaluate
one’s motives does not by itself give one control over them, is
correct. This ability is not sufficient for control. However, the
latter claim, that there is no suitable notion of control requires
further argument, and is incorrect in my view.
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Agent Causation and Unconscious Control
There is a familiar puzzle about freedom that points to the
requisite notion of control. If a free choice is necessitated by
events prior to the choice, it seems the “choice” is not up to the
agent and therefore cannot be free. However, if a free “choice”
is not necessitated by events prior to the choice, then it seems
there can be no adequate explanation for why it occurred: to
the extent it is not necessitated, it seems instead due to chance,
which is not freedom either. One response, which Rowlands
adopts, is compatibilism: a choice may be free even if it is necessitated by events prior to it. Rowlands believes this can be
made plausible by describing freedom in terms of mechanisms
that have beliefs and desires as input and plans of action for
satisfying desires as output. Another response, which Rowlands rejects, is that freedom just is the power to cause an event
without being necessitated to do so. On this agent-causal view,
an agent, which is a substance, originates free actions (without
being fully caused to do so).
According to the agent-causal view, an agent’s free choice
consists in their directly causing (the initiation of) an action
without being necessitated to do so (Rowe 1991). On my understanding of this view, one’s reasons or motives for various
actions give one inclinations, of varying strengths, to act in
various ways. Importantly, an agent may feel an inclination to
act without being aware of their underlying motives or reasons
to act in that way or some other. Nevertheless, in making a
choice, the agent is choosing to act on some reasons and motives and not others. This possibly unconscious selection from
among reasons and motives is essential to the ability to cause
an action without being necessitated or fully caused to do so,
and is therefore common to all free actions.
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It may be difficult to imagine selecting one reason over others unconsciously or assigning weights or values to reasons one
is unaware of, but it also seems quite common. Many actions
we regard as free choices, such as choosing how to react to
someone, are made without conscious awareness or any reflection on what can be complicated underlying motives. Also,
many behaviors that are done without thinking seem to have
some degree of freedom, such as choosing the precise path one
walks home, or how to swing a bat at a pitch, for example. It
certainly seems that we could have done such things slightly
differently, perhaps by choosing to direct our attention differently or to make a different effort. These behaviors do not
seem purely automatic in all their specificity, and yet they are
done without conscious awareness of selecting their specificity. Moreover, there is good reason to think that consciousness
of making a choice itself is not essential to free choice: a free
choice must be explanatorily prior to consciousness of it and so
its existence cannot require one’s consciousness of it.
Rowlands assumes free choice cannot involve such unconscious selection among reasons and motives. He says his rejection of the idea that control over motivations is grounded in
the ability to critically assess those motivations is equivalent to
the rejection of agent causation (Rowlands 2015, 236). But to
assume that the ability to critically scrutinize one’s motives is
the only idea of control the agent-causal theorist can plausibly
have in mind as a requirement for moral freedom is to assume
that an agent must be conscious not only of their inclinations to
act, but also of their reasons for those inclinations. But, again,
much of our mental lives is unconscious and it is plausible, at
least on an agent-causal view of freedom, that often when we
choose, we are unconsciously selecting from many motives
and reasons we are unaware of. Furthermore, in a discussion
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of animal freedom it is important to consider the possibility of
unconscious selection among reasons for action, even if there
is reason to question it. To understand animal freedom we cannot only consider paradigmatically human fully self-reflective
decision making.

Animal Morality: Control without Metacognition
Rowlands describes the intuitions behind the key idea he
rejects, namely, that it is the ability to critically evaluate one’s
motives that gives one the control over one’s motives required
for moral normativity, by contrasting Myshkin, representing
animals, who is motivated by moral emotions but cannot reflect
on them, with Marlow, who can assess his own motives in the
light of moral principles:
It is easy to feel the intuitive pull of the idea that Marlow’s ability to metacognize could imbue him with
control over his motivations. Myshkin is the subject
of motivations of various sorts. However, because he
cannot reflect on those motivations, but simply act on
them, he is, in one fairly clear sense, at their “mercy.”
These motivations push him this way and that - causing him to act one way or another. But Myshkin has
no control over where - and how far - these motivations push him. These motivations are, one might suspect, always merely causes ... they exert no normative
grip on Myshkin. … [Myshkin] is tossed this way and
that - a bobbing cork on a sea of motivations. Marlow’s
metacognitive abilities, on the other hand, allow him to
float above this sea. He is able to observe his motivations and, by following certain evaluative procedures,
adjudicate between them. Because of this, Marlow has
control over his motivations in a way that Myshkin
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does not. In virtue of his metacognitive abilities, Marlow can decide which motivation he is to act on and
which he is to reject. And, in virtue of this, Marlow’s
motivations have a normative dimension that Myshkin’s lack. Marlow’s motivations belong to the space
of moral reasons, not the space of causes (Rowlands
2015, 169-170).
Rowlands rejects this picture for reasons already mentioned,
though he says he finds it intuitively compelling. What Rowlands attributes to this picture, and what he rejects, is the idea
that Marlow’s metacognitive abilities confer a control that
Myshkin lacks. However, the thought conveyed in this description is not just that Marlow’s self-awareness gives him control,
but also that Myshkin’s lack of self-awareness means he does
not have control. What Rowlands does not dispute is the assumption guiding this thinking that is most relevant to a consideration of animal freedom, namely, that because Myshkin is
unaware of his motives, his actions are necessitated by them;
that because he is unaware of his reasons for acting he is (deterministically) caused to act by them; that he cannot unconsciously select from among his reasons or motives in choosing.
The agent-causal view does not grant this assumption. On
my understanding of this view, the reason one freely acts on
does not cause the free action, nor one’s causing of it. The various reasons and motives one has, along with their respective
strengths, contribute to the explanation of why one freely acted
as one did in that they are available for selection and perhaps
in ordering selection probabilities, but a complete explanation
must include that one chose to act on one reason rather than another (or decided to value some motives or reasons over others).
Therefore, on the agent-causal view, Myshkin, who represents
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animals, can exercise some degree of control over his behavior.
On this view, control is a metaphysically primitive power, the
power to choose, not equivalent to conscious control. Again,
it cannot be essentially conscious because it is explanatorily
prior to consciousness of it. So the agent causation view provides animals with a kind of control, as prima facie required
for moral normativity.
Additionally, the thinking behind the common attribution of
moral behavior solely to humans, though centrally involving
the notion of self-control, may not be accurately represented
by Rowlands’ description. Animals do seem to have some degree of control over their behavior and therefore some measure of freedom, even if within the constraints of instinctual
responses. Accordingly, it may be commonly thought not that
animals lack any kind of control, but that animals’ (Myshkin’s)
lack of self-awareness means they do not have the right kind
of control for moral freedom. If this is so, the case for animal
moral behavior is best made not with a reconstruction of the
notion of normativity without the notion of control, but with an
analysis of the kind of control animals may possess, as afforded
by the agent causation view, which provides for normativity,
combined with Rowlands’ own philosophical defense of the
possibility that animals act on the basis of specifically moral
emotions, and appeal to the growing scientific evidence that
they do (Bekoff and Pierce 2010).
To illustrate, the dog who pulled the injured dog from the
highway had a fear that was a reason to abandon the injured
dog and may also have had an emotion of empathic concern
which was a reason to help. These were the prominent emotions, which, along with instincts and other factors, narrowed
her action choices. Within these broad alternatives there were
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many other open possibilities, such as whether or not to dash
into traffic and when, how long to persist, whether to continue
despite the new threat of an oncoming truck, etc. Self-preservation, empathic concern, avoidance of pain, and other motives, had relative strengths, or were perhaps incomparable. In
behaving as she did, the dog selected between them. Of course,
the dog was not conscious of all these reasons and certainly not
conscious of any of them as reasons. Nonetheless in deciding
what to do, when, precisely how, and for how long, etc. she
unconsciously acted on some reasons or motives (or perhaps
unconsciously assigned weights or values to them). Because
the dog could have chosen differently, if not whether to attempt
rescue, in the extent of her rescue effort, the decision was normative, and if a motivating emotion was concern, the dog acted
morally. So agent causation provides the normativity required
for animal moral behavior. Moreover, the agent-causal view,
with a plausible commitment to unconscious selection among
reasons, does so in a way that readily explains why animal
moral behavior does not imply animal moral responsibility, appropriately distinguishing animal from human morality. To see
this, note another respect in which Rowlands’ description of
the intuitions behind the common attribution of moral behavior
solely to humans may not be accurate. Though it is clear that
human self-awareness is thought to enable humans to exercise
control over their motivations, it is not obvious that according
to common reasoning self-awareness by itself confers control,
as Rowlands says in contrasting Marlow and Myshkin. Selfawareness may be thought to supply what is required for morally responsible freedom without being thought sufficient for it.
The agent-causal view makes sense of this idea.
Rowlands’ argument that critical scrutiny does not confer
control appeals to the intuition that just as Myshkin, who lacks
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such scrutiny, is “pushed this way and that” by his moral emotions, Marlow may have full critical scrutiny of his motives
and yet be “pushed this way and that” by his own assessments.
Marlow’s judgments, just as Myshkin’s motives, may be affected by factors he is unaware of, such as his surrounding
environment, and therefore has no control over, Rowlands argues. Even if the idea that moral behavior requires self-control
is rejected by Rowlands for lack of intelligibility, and Marlow
has nothing Myshkin lacks other than metacognition itself, the
intuitive force of Rowlands’ own metaphors remain: if Marlow,
with his moral understanding, is indeed necessitated to make
assessments of his own motivations in ways he has no control
over, how can he be responsible for them? Rowlands’ illustrations intended to show that the ability to critically scrutinize
one’s motives does not give one control over one’s motivations
undermine his view that self and moral understanding, combined with externalist compatabilist normativity, is sufficient
for moral responsibility.
The agent causation construal of animal moral freedom
avoids this objection. Both humans and animals may share
the same basic agent causation freedom, and hence, control,
but differ in moral responsibility because understanding enlarges the scope of what that power can choose between, from
purely unconscious reasons and motives to consciously entertained reasons and moral principles, for example. On the agent
causation view, autonomous or more fully responsible moral
freedom may require the ability to consciously select a desire
to fulfill or goal to acheive and the capacity to form a conscious intention to act for the sake of fulfilling that desire or
achieving that goal. In this case, one has consciously selected
from among one’s potential goals and motivations and formed
a conscious intention that has one’s prioritized motivation as
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its content. This capacity requires recognition of at least some
of one’s own motivations, reasons, and goals, as well as interrogation and assessment of them, in order to consciously select
among them. Because of this self-understanding and conscious
self-control, one is morally responsible for these choices and
so can be praised or blamed for them. Plausibly, only humans
have such autonomous moral freedom. For these reasons, the
agent-causal view explains how animals can be moral yet not
morally responsible better than Rowlands’ compatibilist view.
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